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Abstract
Many argue that elements of a society’s norms, culture or social capital are central to un-
derstanding its development. However, these notions have been diﬃcult to capture in economic
models. Here we argue that ‘trustworthiness’ is the economically relevant component of a so-
ciety’s culture and hence comprises its social capital. Individuals are trustworthy when they
perform actions they have promised, even if these do not maximize their payoﬀs. The usual focus
on incentive structures in motivating behaviour plays no role here. Instead, we emphasize more
deep-seated modes of behaviour and consider that trustworthy agents are socialized to act as they
do. To model this socialization, we borrow from a relatively new process of preference evolution
pioneered by Bisin and Verdier (2001). The model developed endogenously accounts for social
capital and explores its role in the process of economic development. It captures in a simple,
formal way the interaction between social capital and the economy’s productive process. The
results obtained caution against rapid reform, provide an explanation for why late developing
countries cannot easily transplant the modes of production that have proved useful in the West,
and suggest an explanation for the pattern of reform experiences in ex-communist countries.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is often argued that the social norms, attitudes, culture or beliefs predominating in particular
regions of the world have played critical determining roles in their development, or lack thereof.
This intellectual tradition dates back at least as far as Weber (1958), and has seen many modern
restatements, a recent one being Landes (1998). Landes argued that, in seeking to understand
why the countries of sixteenth century Europe advanced beyond others that were better placed,
diﬀerences in culture could not be ignored. Although the form of advance was largely technolog-
ical, and the countries (on the whole) had institutions that did not block technological change,
he argued that these advantages arose out of more deep-seated social attitudes.1 This has not
been a view typically favoured by most economists who instead focus on incentive structures in
explaining individual behaviour, and hence the process of development. From an economist’s
perspective cultural explanations generally leave too much unexplained. ‘Explaining’ behaviour
by positing an underlying disposition to act in a certain way is little more than a tautology.
But if norms or culture are critical, ignoring them will always lead to incomplete explanation,
and, worse still, may result in misguided policy recommendations. The extent of culture’s cen-
trality is an empirical one, but it is one that cannot be simply resolved by a quick consultation
of the empirical record. For every historical sweep which privileges cultural explanations, such as
Landes, there are others which argue for more standard economic forces, such as incentives, e.g.
Easterly (2002). In this respect, micro evidence, for example that gleaned from case studies, can
be instructive, as the tighter focus generally allows fewer contested explanations.
Consider, for example, Uphoﬀ’s (2000) study of one speciﬁc collective irrigation project. This
project started in 1981 in Gal Oya, Sri Lanka, a settlement scheme mainly composed of relocated
households. As the community was constructed from migrants, it lacked many of the structures
common to more long-standing communities, speciﬁcally common roles of leadership. Irrigation,
which was important for production of the staple rice crop, was provided by means of a publicly
owned irrigation system, which, for the preceding thirty years, had been known for its conﬂict.
Disputes, water stealing and breaking of structures was common, and canals were poorly main-
tained and in disrepair. The case study documents the rapid transformation of this deteriorated
and disorganized irrigation system into one of the most eﬃciently and cooperatively managed
systems in Sri Lanka. The transformation did not involve a change in ownership structure, incen-
tives nor enforcement. Instead, the project mobilized and reinforced certain value orientations
of cooperation and generosity that were available within the culture but, up until then, had not
inﬂuenced behavior regarding irrigation.
The program recruited, trained and deployed young persons called Institutional Organizers
1Recent elaborations on this theme can also be found in Platteau (2000) and Basu (2000). Platteau (2000,
p.325) argues also that this view extends back to Adam Smith.
1(IOs) as catalysts for collective action and formation of organizations. These individuals lived
in the farming communities, got to know farmers and their families on a personal basis and,
beginning quite informally, encouraged collective problem solving eﬀorts. The IOs appealed to
norms of fairness and equity that existed in the traditional culture which were publicly articulated
and proposed as criteria for irrigation management behavior. Speciﬁcally, it was suggested that
farmers get together and clean clogged canals or dig new channels as a type of voluntary group
labor contributed to the production of a communit yg o o d .T h i ss u g g e s t i o nd r e wo nat r a d i t i o no f
shramadana, and as Uphoﬀ suggests, exploited a custom already existing in people’s “cognitive
repertoire of acceptable, indeed socially approved, behavior.” As such, it was easily understood
by the farmers and quickly taken up. After only six weeks of IO deplacement, farmers on 90
percent of the ﬁeld channels were engaging in some combination of voluntary collective cleaning
of channels (some of which had not been maintained for 10 or 20 years), rotating water delivery
among users along the channel, so that tail-enders got their fare share, and saving water that
had been issued but was not needed for the needy (in some cases this involved donations from
Sinhalese to Tamil farmers). This rapid increase in cooperation occurred in a season of severe
water shortages and was a complete surprise to researchers, engineers, oﬃcials and the farmers
themselves.
Researchers had expected that, when asked about the outpouring of cooperation, farmers
would respond in terms of incentives and beneﬁts. However, the most frequent response was that
the new structure of organization and interaction made them realize others’ needs for water and
think about the eﬀects of their own wasteful actions. They began taking others’ interests into
account. Four years after the project was complete, production of rice per unit of irrigation water
had increased by 300 percent and the scheme became a model for all major irrigation projects in
the country. It remains eﬀective to this day.
What this example shows is that, in one place, at one time, a view limited to focusing on
incentives would provide little understanding of why a system which previously did not work
was transformed into one which did. In this case study, it was the underlying culture which
gave rise to a possibility for collective action, and which was ultimately harnessed to ensure the
project’s success. Without a comprehensive survey of the case study literature, it is not possible
to gauge how widespread such situations are likely to be, even though there has been a large
increase in the number of such cases studies.2 But, even assuming they are widespread, (and it
will be argued shortly that this is the position held by a number of disciplines) the implications
are not immediate. One view is that if norms of behavior, culture, attitudes or what may be
more broadly termed “social capital” play a central role, then, though these should be taken
2The literature on social capital and its eﬀect on the development process has grown exponentially over the last
5 years. Most of this literature is non-formal, and based on case-studies. An up to date archive of these studies
is maintained by the World Bank at http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/ See other examples like this in
Krishna, Uphoﬀ and Esman (1997).
2into account, their existence is merely data which, though needing to be acknowledged, does
not fundamentally change economic analysis. The contrasting view, maintained here, is that
the norms, social capital or culture are themselves aﬀected by society’s institutions, such as the
market, and by the actions of economic entities, such as ﬁrms. Where these factors are critical
(development is one increasingly suggested area), it is important to understand how they both
shape, and are shaped by, the more traditional economic phenomena with which we are normally
concerned.
This paper presents a model of development which attempts just that. Here, culture plays
a central role, and the way in which culture itself is produced and changes is tackled directly.
Consistent with alternative non-incentive based approaches in other disciplines, particularly so-
ciology, our starting point is that cultural norms are deep-seated components of individuals’
natures. Moreover we are interested in a context where institutions of contract, law and enforce-
ment are not well rooted, so that these norms of behavior will be vital to ensuring that some forms
of production can succeed. The process by which behavioral norms arise in people is modeled
directly via a process of preference evolution. Here, evolution is driven by the socialization eﬀorts
of parents, who are guided in inculcating values by both their own view of what constitutes moral
behaviour, and the economic returns of such behaviour. By placing norms in a central position,
the analysis provides a wholly new approach to economic development; it also provides insights
into the problem of underdevelopment, and yields an economic theory of social capital.
The term social capital has become increasingly fashionable. Common to most deﬁnitions of it
is an element of regard for others that facilitates fruitful interaction where it would otherwise not
be guaranteed. Fukuyama (2000) provides a representative deﬁnition of it as “an instantiated set
of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permits them to cooperate
with one another”. Putnam (1993), Coleman (1990) and Granovetter (1985) provide similar
treatments, and its importance in the context of economic development is increasingly emphasized.
We argue here that the social norm of central importance is trustworthiness, and that social capital
corresponds with a high prevalence of trustworthiness. Trustworthy people are those who keep
their promises, even when doing so is both costly and requires taking actions which may not
maximize payoﬀs. Such trustworthiness is extremely valuable when relationships cannot be fully
circumscribed by contracts, but when trade would be beneﬁcial nonetheless. When conﬁdent
that non-contracted contingencies will not be exploited to one’s detriment, one may be willing
to trade even when promises cannot be guaranteed. A society with many trustworthy members
allows people to have that conﬁd e n c e ,a n di st h u sr i c hi ns o c i a lc a p i t a l . 3
In modeling trustworthiness as a behavioural trait, we depart entirely from economists’ usual
3There have been attempts to measure trustworthiness through surveys and relate these to actual behavior and
economic outcomes; see Glaeser et. al. (2000a) and LaPorta et. al. (1997). Knack and Keefer (1997) also ﬁnd
signiﬁcant relationships between social norms, trust and growth across countries.
3focus on incentive structures. In our framework, by construction, pecuniary incentives always
favor violating promises. We thus exclude the more standard economic treatment of trustwor-
thiness as incentive compatibility, whereby a person is trusted to undertake promised actions
if and only if doing so is in their pecuniary self-interest.4 We do this not because we believe
incentives play no role in explaining behaviour but because this role has already been thoroughly
explored. By shutting down the pecuniary incentive based motivation for action, and treating it
more behaviourally, we are closer to the perspective taken in other social sciences.
Sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists and others who study trustworthiness, almost
universally treat trustworthiness as an inherent personality disposition, and not as an optimizing
response to situational opportunities. It is increasingly argued that personal trustworthiness
considerations play a critical role in determining the reliability of trading partners and hence the
type of production that will be feasible. This is a view which has long been held by sociologists,
and, in economic contexts, has been emphasized in the large literature on supplier networks.
Much of this literature is based on case studies from Northern Italy and Southern Germany as
in Lane and Bachman (1996), Garofoli (1992), Pyke and Sengenberger (1992) and the survey
by Powell and Smith-Doerr (1993). It is also a view which is prominent in the marketing and
organization literatures that analyze inter-organizational relationships. In this literature, trust
stemming from belief in a partner’s inherent type, is vital to sustaining a relationship. Anderson
and Narus (1990), Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman (1992), Morgan and Hunt (1994) and
Doney and Cannon (1997) are examples. The development studies literature, too, has seen an
increasing focus on industrial clusters in LDCs. A pre-existing atmosphere of trust, often arising
from a common earlier ethnic or social connection, pervades successful networks; see for example
Schmitz (1995) and (1999), Schmitz and Nadvi (1999), Altenberg and Meyer-Stamer (1999),
Weijland (1999), McCormick (1999), and the survey in Humphrey and Schmitz (1998). Finally,
it is a view elaborated at length by Seligman (1997), from the perspective of political science.
Though our approach clearly shares much in common with these behavioural based approaches in
other social sciences, our diﬀerence is in endogenously accounting for the emergence of a society’s
4Dasgupta (1988) is a standard economic treatment of trustworthiness in which people can be trusted to perform
promised actions when they are perceived to be incentive compatible. Greif (1994) has explored the insitutional
supports for maintaining incentive compatibility in historical settings. A more recent economic approach to Social
Capital has been developed by Glaeser et. al (2000b). There, an individual’s accumulation of social capital is treated
as an investment decision, not unlike the accumulation of human or physical capital. Though they demonstrate
such an approach has explanatory power, it misses at least one important aspect that has been emphasized in the
sociological case studies that gave rise to the term; that is, the constitutive role that a society’s social capital itself
has on the individuals within that society. Dealing with this aspect requires abandoning the usual economic position
of treating preferences as primitives. Our approach embraces these behavioral aspects which are emphasized in
the use of the term social capital, but comes at the cost of additional complexity in the treatment of individuals.
Recently a number of papers have explored the possibility of cultural characteristics arising as outcomes of models
in which individuals with standard preferences, aiming only at personal gain, interact. This is the approach taken
for instance in Cozzi (1998) and in Fang (2001). Our paper is diﬀerent to both of these since we, in reﬂection of
the largely non-economic literature that we discuss below, argue that in addition to pure payoﬀ maximizers, those
with non-standard preferences (the trustworthy) play a critical role.
4trustworthiness.
To do this, we adopt a process of preference evolution recently formulated by Bisin and
Verdier (2001). Bisin and Verdier argue that, along certain dimensions, an individual’s values are
determined by parental upbringing. In determining which values a child will obtain, and hence
what their preferences will be, parents take into account the lifetime pecuniary returns to having
such values, as in standard evolutionary models. However, they also evaluate these returns,
and the actions their children would undertake, using their own preferences. Thus, in their
framework, though evolution is driven by pecuniary returns, these are not the unique inﬂuence.
Additionally, parents evaluate how they themselves would feel if undertaking actions consistent
with the preferences. Consider the following illustration of how this might yield diﬀerent results
from traditional evolutionary approaches. Suppose a parent values trustworthiness but lives in
a society where trustworthiness does not pay - a child’s being opportunistic is certain to lead to
higher lifetime pecuniary rewards. In standard evolutionary models, where the parent’s values
play no role in determining evolutionary selection, the fact of rewards to opportunism exceeding
those to trustworthiness would imply increased opportunism will ensue. In Bisin and Verdier’s
framework this need not be so. If parents value trustworthiness enough, they may choose to
inculcate it into their children even though it leads to lower lifetime pecuniary rewards.
This approach to preference evolution seems at least as plausible as the more standard evo-
lutionary treatments that focus exclusively on pecuniary returns, or ﬁtness, in that it allows for
conscious reﬂection on the part of the primary socializing agents. Another advantage, as will be
seen, is that it yields a rich set of outcomes which, though inﬂuenced by economic returns to the
diﬀerent behavioural dispositions, are not entirely determined by such economic returns.
The model developed here embeds this process of preference evolution into an environment
in which agents’ returns depend crucially on the actions of proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms. In modeling
the productive side of the economy, our setting is motivated by observations, like those above,
that personal trustworthiness considerations play a critical role in determining the reliability of
trading partners and hence the type of production that will be feasible.5 Thus, a ﬁrm’s deci-
sion to use a technology which, though more productive, requires vulnerability to expropriation,
depends on its beliefs about the population’s trustworthiness and hence on the society’s social
capital. The evolution of individuals, and therefore social capital, is in turn aﬀected by ﬁrms’
production decisions. Social capital is built and maintained when ﬁrms choose production that
leaves them vulnerable to expropriation; for in this sort of production trustworthiness matters,
and the trustworthy types can reap additional rewards. Conversely, when ﬁrms never allow them-
selves to be vulnerable to expropriation, trustworthiness becomes irrelevant, and the evolutionary
process leads to its demise. This inter-relation between the society’s social capital and the actions
5This is often couched as part of a more general argument for the essential accompaniment of social capital to
economic development as in, for example, Grootaert (1997) and Woolcock (1998).
5of ﬁrms will be key to the process of development here. Development succeeds when a beneﬁcial
and mutually reinforcing dynamic emerges between ﬁrms and types. This encourages high levels
of modern production and high levels of social capital.
Since types are an inherent personality disposition, these adjust only slowly to changes in the
underlying environment. Firms’ production decisions, on the other hand, can change relatively
fast. This complementarity between fast changing ﬁrms and slow changing types has signiﬁcant
implications. We explore a situation where, even though new opportunities are inherently more
eﬃcient, they can fail to take hold if introduced too quickly, and their introduction may lower
welfare. Conversely, such changes would have succeeded and raised welfare had they been intro-
duced slowly enough. This scenario illustrates one possible explanation for the poor performance
of late developing countries who had the supposed advantage of the opportunity for rapid tech-
nological catch-up. The existence of a state variable, which is slow to adjust, can also explain
why countries with the same underlying parameters that are locked into a bad steady state, may
ﬁnd it diﬃcult to move to a better one.
Theoretically, the most closely related paper to the present work has been by Noe and Rebello
(1994) who have examined “managerial ethics”. There, ethical managers could be trusted to
apply appropriate eﬀort even when ﬁnancial incentives were not suﬃciently strong to mitigate
agency problems. They consider how production choices vary with aggregate ethic levels, and,
in turn, how ethic levels aﬀect returns to previous levels of ethics. They similarly model choices
of managerial ethics by explicitly considering the eﬀects of parental socialization and allow for
selection of non-payoﬀ maximizing “ethical” behaviour. The focus of the economic part of the
model in our framework is however entirely diﬀerent. Ours is on the production process in LDCs
and the possibility of self-reinforcing interaction between modern production and the trustworthy
type, and policies that can help in ensuring development success. The focus of their model is
cycling ethical levels within already developed countries. Another similarity is to a relatively
recent literature that emphasizes the role played by agents’ non-pecuniary motivations; Francois
(2000), and Besley and Ghatak (2003) examine the implications of such motivations for the role
of public sector provision of services, Akerlof and Kranton (2003) explore the implications of
non-pecuniary motivations in the worker-ﬁrm relationship.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets up the model, Section 3 analyses the model,
determining steady states, dynamics and welfare, and Section 4 derives the main results including
the policy implications. A brief conclusion is provided in Section 5.
2 The Model
The economy is inﬁnitely lived and each period is denoted by a t subscript. Each period there is
born a unit measure of ex ante identical potential entrepreneurs who live for one period. These
6agents decide whether to enter entrepreneurship and engage in “modern” production, which
leaves them vulnerable to opportunism on the part of trading partners, or stay in “traditional”
production, where there is no such vulnerability. Traditional production is normalized to have
returns of 0. At the same time, the trading partners of these entrepreneurs, called “contractors”,
a r ea l s ob o r n ,a n dw ea s s u m et h a tt h e ya r ea l s oof measure 1 in total and also live for only one
period.6
Modern production necessarily requires the purchase of services (or goods) over which there
is no possibility of formal contracting. If successful, the interaction generates a positive surplus;
however, uncertainty arises because, lacking contracts, entrepreneurs are vulnerable to oppor-
tunistic trading partners. In particular, entrepreneurs must invest a ﬁxed and sunk amount,
k>0, in the project before production can occur. If the services promised by their trading part-
ner, the “contractor”, are correctly contributed, the project is successful and generates a gross
surplus π (pt), where pt ∈ [0,1] is the total number of entrepreneurs producing at time t, and the
function π(pt) is continuous. The net potential surplus of the project is thus π (pt) − k.
If, however, the contractor does not contribute the required inputs, then the sunk amount k is
lost by the entrepreneur. The gross surplus to a single project in the modern sector is decreasing
in the total number of entrepreneurs, for any of the usual reasons, so that π0 (pt) < 0, and the
decline in proﬁtability occurs at an increasing rate, π00 (pt) ≤ 0.7 We denote π(0) = πu and
π(1) = πl as the upper and lower bounds of modern production respectively. T h e r ei sf r e ee n t r y
into entrepreneurship up to the exogenous population size 1.
The lack of contracting in our model is pervasive, as in Grossman and Hart (1986): it is
impossible to hold the contractor liable if the correct eﬀort is not contributed; there is also no
possibility of writing an ex ante agreement between the parties that will divide the gross surplus,
π(pt), ex post, in case of success. When successful, we assume that the entrepreneur is able
to appropriate proportion α of the gross surplus, while the contractor obtains the remaining
(1 − α).8 The precise division is immaterial, all that is necessary is that α does not take on either
of the extreme values, so we assume throughout that α ∈ (0,1).
6It may seem artiﬁcial to assume equal numbers of traders on both sides of the market. However, this buys
us nothing here, since we allow for free entry of entrepreneurs and entry never exhausts supply, i.e. is always less
than 1. We could thus, without loss of generality, assume a potentially larger population of entrepreneurs without
eﬀect.
7This could be because there is diminishing returns at the aggregate level, or underlying heterogeneity in abilities,
or simply through increased competition in the ﬁnal product market which reduces the value of output. Allowing
for the case of π
00 > 0 does not alter the paper’s main results, but makes the analysis more complicated. We discuss
this case further after the results are presented.
8In a successful relationship this division may occur through transfers between the parties, or perhaps directly
through pricing of the input. We do not model how this division occurs. An alternative and equivalent interpretation
of the shares is as arising from a Nash bargaining game over the ﬁnal output π (pt) between the parties, with the
entrepreneur’s relative bargaining strength captured through the parameter α. Thus the outcome of this bargaining
game is that the entrepreneur receives amount απ (pt) and the contractor amount (1 − α)π (pt). Alternatively,
generating such divisions from more basic primitives, such as an alternative oﬀers bargaining game, as in Rubinstein
(1982), would also change nothing.
7A potential moral hazard problem arises because the contractor gains a ﬁnancial beneﬁto f
amount b>0 if NOT performing the actions promised to the entrepreneur. We can think of this
amount b as the beneﬁt obtained from not having to exert the eﬀort required to produce high
quality, or the savings that come from substituting cheaper inputs, or the cost saving from not
engaging in proper quality control, or it could, alternatively, denote the monetary beneﬁt the con-
tractor can expropriate from the project. The precise form of this gain in particular applications
will depend upon both the type of production and the pervasiveness of contracting limitations.
A concrete example is the emphasis on quality (and its non-contractibility) that is a pervasive
problem highlighted by small scale entrepreneurs in case studies of industrial networks, as docu-
mented by Katz (1987) who provides a comprehensive overview in the Latin American context.
The assumption of no formal contracting may seem unrealistic, but introducing the possibility of
formal contracting over some elements of the relationship would not change things provided there
remained some components that could not be speciﬁed under the contract. For example, with
formal contracting over the timeliness of delivery (allowing punishment for lateness), the amount
b may correspond to reducing quality in a way which could not be described by the contract. If
we were thus to enrich the framework to allow contracting over some elements of the interaction,
the amount b would then correspond to whatever is left over after all the things that can be
contracted over have been. We assume b is independent of the entrepreneur’s ﬁxed cost, k, which
shall vary in the comparative static exercise, though they could alternatively be positively linked
without loss of generality.
2.1 Preferences
Entrepreneurs care only about expected returns. Contractors, on the other hand, are one of two
diﬀerent “types”. A contractor is either “trustworthy” or “opportunistic”. These characteristics
are intrinsic to the individual, inculcated by social conditioning (described in the next section),
private information, and not subject to change throughout the individual’s life. Once having
promised to undertake the correct actions, trustworthy individuals would never choose to do
otherwise. This is a short hand way of saying that they are moral (in Taylor’s (1989) sense of a
strong evaluator). Though physically able to break promises, preferences are such that violating
their undertaking makes them so much more worse oﬀ that they do not even consider doing it.9
Since these individuals eﬀectively have fewer choices in all of their lifetime interactions, these
preferences carry costs. We model these simply as an amount F, measured in the utility metric.10
9This is also similar to what Basu (2001) has termed an “action limiting norm” or what Platteau (2000) analyzes
under the heading of “moral norms”.
10F is measured in this way because we do not model any of the other lifetime interactions and opportunities,
which we assume are orthogonal to their contracting activities. Enriching the model of lifetime interactions to
allow these costs to arise endogenously, by for example allowing individuals to interact on other dimensions, would
not qualitatively alter the main results.
8Such individuals also “enjoy” fulﬁlling their commitments. That is, when making good on their
promises they receive a psychological, non-pecuniary, beneﬁt. The existence of such intrinsic
rewards seems an indisputable part of many individuals’ makeups, and is well recognized in the
socio-psychological literature. Platteau (2000, p. 299) provides an extensive discussion of the
evidence regarding such intrinsic motivation and they are also examined in Elster (1989), Weber
(1978), Opp (1979), Jones (1984) and Coleman (1990). We model such rewards here by the
parameter γ, w h i c hi sa l s om e a s u r e di nt h eu t i l i t ym e t r i c .
For simplicity, utility is assumed to be linear in consumption (or equivalently income) y,a n d
we specify γ and F so that utility of a trustworthy person, uT
t , living in period t can simply be
expressed as the addition of these three components. That is:
uT
t = yt + dtγ − F,
where dt =1if the individual has met promised commitments, and dt =0if no such commitments
were made. We do not explicitly denote the utility realized when breaking promised commitments
as we assume this is low enough to never be chosen.11
Opportunists diﬀer in that they always maintain the possibility of violating their commit-
ments, without personal loss. These individuals are simply homo-economicus. They neither feel
a sense of remorse when violating promises, nor feel good when delivering on their promises, and
are concerned only with outcomes. For opportunists then, the amount γ =0always, and prior
promises do not restrict their actions. Their lifetime utility, uO
t , only depends on the amount of




By design, we are interested in situations where the pecuniary logic of the contractor’s decision
favors not fulﬁlling their obligations. In that case, only contractors that are trustworthy will
perform as required. A simple restriction that ensures this is:
(1 − α)πu <b . (1)
Given (1), opportunists will never meet promises of reliable delivery when contracting with
entrepreneurs, so uO = b, if trading with an entrepreneur. A trustworthy individual, however,
because of the prohibitive disutility to deceiving their trading partner, delivers the good or service
as promised and realizes a successful project, their share of which is (1 − α)π (pt). In addition,
they receive the non-pecuniary beneﬁt, γ, but, they have also suﬀered a lifetime loss from their
11This assumption does make the model appear similar to a model in which evolution selects strategies instead
of preferences. As will be seen this is not the case for the opportunists who choose actions to maximize material
payoﬀs and will, if returns are high enough, choose to mimic the strategies of the trustworthy. More generally,
the modelling of the trustworthys’ behaviour could be extended slightly to allow for them to break promises when
pecuniary payoﬀs are high enough, without altering any of the paper’s basic ﬁndings.
9reduced choice set of F, so that their lifetime utility is uT =( 1− α)π (pt)+γ−F.12 If not trading,
recall that each receives their alternative pecuniary rewards normalized to 0. The lifetime utility
of a trustworthy individual in that case is uT = −F, and the opportunist obtains uO =0 .
2.2 Matching process
We assume that each entrepreneur matches with at most one contractor once in their life. Given
their opportunity costs of trade, any contractor, both opportunistic and trustworthy, is better
oﬀ trading with an entrepreneur than pursuing their alternative, yielding utility 0; opportunists
would cheat and obtain bt > 0 from the interaction, trustworthy would trade honestly and receive
(1 − α)π(pt)+γ>0. Since there is a stable measure 1 of contractors in the population each
period, this implies that the number of contractors who are willing to trade at least weakly
exceeds the number of entrepreneurs in modern production. Thus the contractors’ side of the
market is always in zero or positive excess supply, but since contractors’ types are unobservable,
and ex post divisions of the surplus cannot be mandated by contract, the excess supply cannot
be adjusted by competition between the contractors. Consequently, the contractors are rationed
randomly with pt, which denotes the proportion of entrepreneurs in modern production at time
t, also denoting the probability of a contractor trading with an entrepreneur then.
For given pt, expected lifetime utility of a contractor of either type is:
E[uT




2.3 Cultural evolution of preferences
The determination of individual types, i.e., trustworthy or opportunistic, is driven by an evo-
lutionary process of cultural selection. This part of the model borrows heavily from Bisin and
Verdier (2001) who have developed a model of cultural evolution in the spirit of Boyd and Rich-
erson (1985) and Noe and Rebello (1994) which recognizes that successful enculturation need not
be equivalent with payoﬀ maximization. Here selection is not exclusively based on ﬁtness, as in
standard evolutionary models, but instead on the parents’ evaluation of lifetime returns based on
their own preferences.
There is asexual 1 for 1 reproduction with the possibility of only two types in the population;
the trustworthy and the opportunists, as speciﬁed above. Intergenerational transmission of pref-
12In reality, there can be other beneﬁts to being trustworthy that do not depend on realizing trading opportunities.
That is, it might be possible that the beneﬁte m b o d i e di nt h et e r mγ could be realized through other forms of
interaction, and thus support the evolution of trustworthiness, even in the absence of risk taking entrepreneurs.
We rule this out of the modeling here, but it is one way of interpreting the recent discussion regarding the demise
of voluntary and civic organizations and its impact on social capital, as raised by Putnam (2000) and others.
10erences occurs through a stochastic socialization process. Increased parental eﬀort at socialization
increases the probability that an oﬀspring will be the same type as the parent. When a parent
socializes a child to have the same preferences as themselves we call this direct socialization.
There is also a probability that an individual’s characteristics will be determined by imitation
of someone outside the family, a process which we call indirect socialization. Let the fraction of
individuals who are trustworthy, or T type, be denoted β and those not, the O type, are fraction
1 − β. The probability that a trustworthy parent directly socializes a child into being trustwor-
thy is denoted dT (βt,p t); correspondingly, the probability that an opportunist directly socializes
their child into being an opportunist is dO (βt,p t). Both of these probabilities are allowed to be
functions of the proportions of each type in the population, βt, and the measure of entrepreneurs
in production, pt. We will return to the precise relationship subsequently.
If a child from a family with trait i = T or O is not directly socialized by their parent, then
he or she is indirectly socialized with a trait by imitating a randomly chosen non-family member.
This person may be a teacher, more distant family member, or anyone else with inﬂuence, but
the upshot is that the probability of indirect socialization to a particular type simply reﬂects
the frequency of that type in the population. Thus, for a family of type T,w i t hp r o b a b i l i t y
1−dT (βt,p t) the child is not directly socialized by the parent, then with probability βt the child
is indirectly socialized to be T anyway, and with probability 1−βt she is indirectly socialized to
be O type. Conversely for a child of an opportunistic parent, with probability dO (βt,p t) the child
is directly socialized by the parent; however, failing this, with probability 1−βt, she is indirectly
socialized to be the same type as her parent anyway, and with probability βt she is indirectly
socialized to be trustworthy. If we let Pij denote the probability that a child from a family with
type i is socialized to trait j, then, by the law of large numbers, Pij will also denote the fraction
of children with a type i parent who have preferences of type j.13 We then have the following
equations describing these probabilities:
PTT
t = dT (βt,p t)+
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t = dO (βt,p t)+
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1 − dO (βt,p t)
¢
βt (2)
From these, the diﬀerence equation for β is:
βt+1 − βt = βt (1 − βt)
£
dT (βt,p t) − dO (βt,p t)
¤
.
We shall use the continuous time limit of this, as is standard in evolutionary models, from now
13We evoke the law of large numbers over the unit interval here, see Bisin and Verdier (2001) and the references
therein for justiﬁcation of this.
11on. Thus:
dβt = βt (1 − βt)
£
dT (βt,p t) − dO (βt,p t)
¤
. (3)
This diﬀerential equation describes how βt evolves in a population depending on the social-
ization eﬀorts of parents of the diﬀerent types. It is clear from equation (3) that the direction
of evolutionary change depends critically on the relative probabilities dT (βt,p t) − dO (βt,p t).I t ,
very intuitively, states that if the probability of direct socialization by a parent of type T exceeds
that of a parent of type O then evolutionary pressures lead to an increase in type T and vice
versa. We now structure these socialization probabilities di.
Direct socialization is increasing in relative returns to own type
We assume that parents, in deciding whether to socialize their own children after themselves,
evaluate the expected lifetime utility of a person of their own type. The only reasonable assump-
tion to make here is that, the better a person of their own type does relative to the other type
when evaluated with their own preferences (which can involve more than just income), the higher
the probability of direct socialization.










when evaluated using type T0s preferences,










when evaluated using type O0s preferences, where
E denotes the expectations operator. Clearly, the only diﬀerence in parental types’ evaluations of
outcomes is caused by the entry of the non-pecuniary, γ, term for the trustworthy parents. Thus,
with pt ﬁrms in modern production, the evaluation from the perspective of trustworthy parents










= pt [(1 − α)π(pt)+γ − b] − F. Similarly











= pt [b − (1 − α)π(pt)]+F. It thus follows directly that the diﬀerence in proba-
bilities, dT (βt,p t) − dO (βt,p t), is increasing in the expression pt [(1 − α)π(pt) − b] − F + ptγ/2.
Note also that because γ is arbitrary, we can with loss of generality replace the latter expression
with pt [(1 − α)π (pt) − b] − F + ptγ.
Thus, let Φ : R → [−1,1] deﬁne the mapping from pt [(1 − α)π (pt)+γ − b] − F to the prob-
ability diﬀerence dT (βt,p t)−dO (βt,p t).A p a r tf r o mΦ0 > 0 derived above, the precise operation
of the evolutionary process will depend critically on additional properties of this mapping. First,
for simplicity, we will assume that Φ is continuous. More importantly, to provide any interesting
insight into the evolution of preferences we must allow for socialization probabilities to vary with
utility realizations in a way that would allow the possibility of both types being represented in
the population. In particular, we need to rule out situations in which one type clearly dominates.
For example, if it is always true that dO <d T, then the evolutionary dynamics implied by (3)
necessarily drives β → 1. Conversely, if always dO >d T then β → 0 always. At this point, this
simply involves an arbitrary restriction on the value at which the Φ function changes sign. That
is, we assume:
Φ(0) = 0. (4)
12As will be seen, the parametric restrictions that will be imposed in section 2.5, when combined
with (4), ensure that both types will be possible.
Substituting the Φ mapping into the replicator function, equation (3), we obtain an expression
describing the evolution of β, the proportion of trustworthy agents in the population:
dβt = βt (1 − βt)Φ(pt [(1 − α)π (pt)+γ − b] − F). (5)
Note the “slow” adjustment implied by such an evolutionary speciﬁcation. If direct parental
socialization favors increased trustworthiness, dT >d O, then evolution will produce more trust-
worthy individuals, but the population will not immediately become full of trustworthy types.
2.4 Dynamic adjustment of entrepreneurs
T h ee q u a t i o no fm o t i o nf o rpt is more straightforward. The critical assumption here is that
entrepreneurs can enter and exit quickly relative to the speed at which individuals’ characteristics
change. Entrepreneurial expected returns in modern production are:
E [απ (pt)] = αβtπ(pt) − k (6)
We assume all of this adjustment occurs immediately.14 In particular, for given βt deﬁne p∗
t ∈ R
such that: αβtπ(p∗
t)−k =0 . Note that p∗
t is unique. Thus, motion in this dimension is described
by the following equations. For a given pt,
if αβtπ (pt) − k<0,t h e npt >p ∗
t and entrepreneurs exit so that pt =m a x {0,p ∗
t};
if αβtπ(pt) − k>0, then pt <p ∗
t and entrepreneurs enter so that pt =m i n {1,p ∗
t};
if αβtπ(pt) − k =0 , then pt = p∗





These assumptions assure that p is a jump variable, which implies that entrepreneurs are
always in equilibrium, entering or exiting risky modern production immediately.
2.5 Parameter restrictions
We ﬁrst assume that trustworthiness is critical for entrepreneurial production:
Assumption 1. If everyone is trustworthy, then production is always proﬁtable:
απ (1) = απl >k .
14Nelson and Winter (1982) in their classic application of evolutionary considerations to ﬁrms, argue that the
speed of ﬁrm adjustment will be quicker than that of individual types. Here we do not treat the entrepreneurhip that
underlies ﬁrms as evolutionary because we are not allowing factors, other than the purely pecuniary, to enter into
entrepreneurial decisions. We could modify the framework to allow for ﬁrms to respond in an evolutionary manner
and this would not aﬀect results provided that they still changed more quickly than individual types, and they
continued to be driven by evolutionary forces that are pecuniary. It may seem strange to treat entrepreneurship,
and thus ﬁrms, as wholly pecuniary, while at the same time treating type selection as aﬀected by more than the
purely pecuniary. However, the evolutionary pressures that come to bear on ﬁrms are much more likely to be payoﬀ
based. In particular, ﬁrms that follow explicitly non-pecuniary motivations should be driven out of the market by
the forces of competition. However, in the process of cultural selection it is not necessarily true that non-payoﬀ
maximizing strategies are selected against.
13Assumption 2. If no one is trustworthy, then production can never be proﬁtable:
πu is ﬁnite valued.
Assumption 2 is suﬃcient to rule out production occurring without the trustworthy. It seems
a natural assumption to make but we note it here explicitly since it is inconsistent with Inada
conditions. Assumption 1 ensures trustworthiness has substantial impact on production. All
potential entrepreneurs would be able to enter modern production if only there were enough
trustworthy individuals around.
The following two restrictions aﬀect type selection:
Assumption 3.
(1 − α)πu + γ − b>0.
This assumption ensures that the net pecuniary beneﬁt to being trustworthy in the best possible
case, i.e. when it yields highest possible returns relative to an opportunist, (1 − α)πu − b, plus
the utility beneﬁt to such action, γ, has to be positive.15 If this did not hold, it could never be the
case that evolutionary forces could ever favor the selection of the trustworthy type. Finally we
cap the returns to trustworthiness so that this is not always selected irrespective of environment:
Assumption 4.
(1 − α)πl + γ − b<0,
recalling that the term πl denotes the lowest level of gross proﬁt from a successful interaction.
2.6 Steady states
The interaction between equations (5) and (7) determines the model’s steady states. From (5)








pt [(1 − α)π (pt)+γ − b] − F. (8)
The sign of (8) determines the direction of evolutionary change, dβ, for β 6=0or 1.I t d o e s
not directly depend on β, but depends in a non-monotonic way on p. The non-monotonicity is
intuitive. The chance of trading with an entrepreneur depends on their frequency, i.e., pt outside
t h es q u a r eb r a c k e t si n(8). B u tt h er e l a t i v eb e n e ﬁts of trading also depend on pt, negatively,
because the term (1 − α)π (pt)+γ − b is monotonically decreasing in pt — as the proportion of
successful trades increases, each successive one creates less surplus. The derivative of (8) with
respect to pt yields:
(1 − α)π (pt)+γ − b + pt (1 − α)π0 (pt). (9)
15Without this assumption, our evolutionary framework becomes degenerate, opportunism is the only outcome
and production can never occur. Necessarily, if we altered the function Φ in the replicator dynamic then the values
in Assumption 3 would also have to be altered, but intuitively the same relationships would have to hold. Of
course, the assumption is necessary but not suﬃcient, since the term F is not included, but the main existence
result is stated conditional on F.
14The sign of this is indeterminate, however the second derivative of the expression (8) simply
reduces to:
2(1− α)π0 (pt)+pt (1 − α)π00 (pt) < 0, (10)
where the sign follows since π0,π00 < 0.16 Since (1 − α)π (0) + γ − b>0, the function initially
slopes upwards at p =0 , reaches a unique turning point at which it changes slope, and then








This expression is useful for establishing the model’s existence proposition for interior steady
states.























− k =0 . (12)
16If the model were extended to allow π
00 > 0, then the second derivative would, in general, not be possible to
sign. This would imply the possibility of multiple crossing points in the interior, which as will be seen, implies the
possibility of multiple interior steady states. As stated earlier, this does not change the model’s main qualitative
results, which we demonstrate once these have been established.
15The formal proof of this, and all other results, is contained in the appendix, but the way the
model operates can be understood diagramatically. The condition that p[(1 − α)π (p)+γ − b]−
F>0 ensures that, in Figure 1, there exist some values of p such that the curved line which
represents the net beneﬁt of being trustworthy, exceeds the amount F, its costs. Since the beneﬁts
of trustworthiness are independent of β, this implies dβ in β,p s p a c ei sa sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e2
below, with the dβ =0lines corresponding to the crossing points between the curved line and F
in Figure 1, and the point pA g i v e ni m p l i c i t l yb yt h ev a l u ea tw h i ch the term in large parentheses






d β =0 d β =0
Figure 2, dβ =0loci
In the interior between pB and pA, evolutionary returns favour trustworthiness since the curve
in Figure 1 is above F. Otherwise it is below, so that evolutionary forces lead to declines in β.
Similarly, entrepreneurial entry is given by equation (7), so the locus at which dp =0is where






Figure 3, dp =0locus
Combining the two ﬁgures 2 and 3 yields the phase space for both endogenous variables, and
steady states are the points of intersection in these. Assumptions 1-4, stated above, are suﬃcient















Figure 4, Interior Steady States
In the stable interior steady state
¡
βA,p A¢
, entry of entrepreneurs into modern production
up to pA provides evolutionary incentives for maintenance of proportion βA trustworthy types
17in the population, which is the society’s stock of social capital. But, in turn, with proportion
βA trustworthy types in the population, entrepreneurial entry up to pA just dissipates expected
proﬁts of entry.
Note the central role played by the non-standard evolutionary dynamic that we have used
here. By construction, condition (1), opportunists always do better than the trustworthy in a
strictly pecuniary sense. If we had used a traditional replicator dynamic based only on ﬁtness
as in Nyberg (1997) or Fershtman and Weiss (1998), there would never exist an interior steady
state, since trustworthiness could never exist and we would always have zero social capital.17
The dynamic we have used recognizes, however, that parental decisions regarding socialization of
oﬀ-spring are based on more than pecuniary assessments, and include an evaluation of expected
outcomes using their own preferences. Thus trustworthiness can persist in steady state if parents
estimate that the utility returns to being trustworthy are high enough, as in the interior steady
state.
There also exist possible steady states at the corners:
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1-4 there exists a stable steady state with no modern produc-
tion, complete opportunism, and hence no social capital (β =0 ,p=0 ) . There also exists a steady
state at (β =1 ,p=1 )but this is unstable.
Without entry into entrepreneurship, p =0 , the trustworthy earn strictly lower lifetime re-
wards than opportunists and none exist, β =0 . This is self-reinforcing, for without any trust-
worthy agents, modern production is bound to fail and entrepreneurs do not enter.
The multiplicity of steady states here suggests a possible explanation for why countries with
seemingly equal access to technology show such marked diﬀerences in total factor productivity.
Prescott (1998) argues that technology diﬀerences are an inescapably large source of diﬀerences
in consumption per head across countries, and that there do not exist good theories as to why
total factor productivity should vary by so much, given the relatively easy mobility of know-how
across countries. The theory here suggests a partial explanation. According to our theory, the
use of such technologies requires vulnerability to opportunism, and rational ﬁrms will only risk
17In their frameworks non-maximizing behavior can persist in evolutionary equilibrium because it is assumed
that type is observable, at least with some probability. With this assumption, trading partners will seek out the
trustworthy and punish the opportunists by simply avoiding trade with them. This generates evolutionary rewards
to individuals who, by their preferences, can pre-commit to not acting opportunistically. Our framework, motivated
as it is by the development literature, assumes it is not possible to directly observe types. This literature, as for
example in Katz (1987), emphasizes vulnerability to unreliable trading partners precisely because opportunists
cannot be readily discerned, and would suggest that direct observation of an individual’s type, as in Nyberg (1997),
Fershtman and Weiss (1998) or Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel (2002), where observation is only probabilistic, is not
the right sort of approach to use in these settings. The development studies literature also emphasizes the limited
nature of interaction, and uncertainty regarding the future, which both thwart attempts to develop reputational
trust based on repeated interaction. This is an advantage of the present approach over evolutionary models which
support non-maximizing behaviour through repetition of interaction, as in Axelrod’s (1984) well known example,
or credible commitments based on repetition, as explored by Greif (1994).
18this if they believe traders are trustworthy enough, so that social capital is high. This leads to
a complementarity between users of the modern technology and social capital, which can cause
some economies to be trapped in a low trust steady state, where the technology, even though
available, can never be proﬁtably utilized. We think of this as only a ‘partial explanation’ because
the theory provides no insight as to why it should be the currently poor countries that are stuck
in the low social capital steady state and the developed ones in the high one. The dynamics of
change in this system, which we now consider, can however provide a possible explanation for
this, which we explore in Section 3.
2.7 Dynamics
As the phase diagram in Figure 4 depicts, the dynamics of this system vary depending on whether
β is above or below βB. Entry into entrepreneurship is instantaneous, as given by equation (7),
and evolution of types is gradual. The variable p is a jump variable, implying that adjustment in
the horizontal direction is immediate, so that from any point not on the dp =0locus, adjustment
involves immediate change in p until the system is on the locus. Thus for all points at which




. Conversely, β<β B will lead to convergence on (0,0) as dictated by

















Figure 5, Convergence paths
192.8 Welfare
Since preferences are not primitives, but evolve according to the evolutionary dynamic, standard
welfare assessments do not apply. Here we deﬁne a partial ordering over outcomes reﬂecting
Pareto type considerations, which we shall use subsequently:
Deﬁnition: Situation A is a welfare improvement over Situation B if and only if in Situation
A the expected utility of each agent type — entrepreneur, trustworthy and opportunist — is at least
as great as it is in situation B, and, moreover, at least one of the agent types has strictly higher
expected utility in A than in B.
This welfare ordering is only partial because it cannot rank situations where some types are
made strictly better oﬀ and others strictly worse oﬀ. It is a natural analogue of the Pareto
criterion for improvement in our environment where the frequency of types can diﬀer.
Free entry into entrepreneurship in modern production always dissipates extra returns there,
but in the interior steady state, contractors of both types obtain surplus from interaction with
ﬁrms. We thus have:
Proposition 3 Welfare in the stable interior steady state,
¡
βA,p A¢
, exceeds that in the stable
corner steady state, (0,0).
3 D e v e l o p m e n tT h r o u g hT r a d ea n dM o d e r nP r o d u c t i o n
We now use the framework to explore some basic implications for the process of development. The
engine of development we consider here is the implementation of more productive technologies in
the modern entrepreneurial sector. One obstacle to the introduction of these technologies is that
they involve scale economies, and the small size of domestic markets in LDCs compared with
domestic markets in developed economies, impedes exploiting these. However, the possibility of
trading on world markets should allow producers in small markets to exploit scale economies
in the production process, and export labour intensive production in reﬂection of their greater
labour endowment. This was part of the reasoning motivating the shift in focus away from
import substituting industrialization, which had been emphasized by post war governments in
LDCs, towards export led industrialization in the early 1980s. Up until the 1960s and, in most
countries until the end of the 1970s, LDCs followed policies that largely dissuaded trade. These
included over-valuation of the currency, quotas on imports, tariﬀs, directed subsidies, low interest
rates with credit rationing and directed ﬁnancing to favoured sectors (usually heavy industry).
Debt servicing problems that occurred through the 1980s lead to the partial abandonment of
most of these measures at the behest of multinational lending organizations. Also, even where
aggregate ﬁnancial problems were not the direct precipitating factor, the demonstration eﬀect
of the successful late industrializers of East Asia (Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and
20Singapore) which, though also having a heavy role for government, focused on export markets,
lead to a wave of change in policy to redress biases against trade. These eﬀects were manifest to
greater or lesser degree in most developing regions of the world. In Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America largely through structural adjustment programs and even in South Asia, where levels of
indebtedness did not mandate change externally.18
The concrete manifestation of this in policy towards LDCs occurred throughout the 1980s
and into the 1990s. The modern sector in LDCs in which the concerns of trustworthiness are
most clearly evident are the industrial clusters or supply networks occurring in cottage industries
and small manufacturing enterprises. And it has been argued that these were the areas most
challenged by the shift to openness over the period, see for example Altenberg and Meyer-Stamer
(1999, p.1700) for a discussion of this. This will be the focus of the policy analysis undertaken
here. We shall abstract from the details of these policy changes and model the main impact of
openness in a twofold manner. An opening to trade implies, on the one hand, the possibility of
import of cheaper mass produced goods from abroad which is a potential threat to producers
who are selling to a local market. This was the case of clusters considered by McCormick (1999)
in Africa and for those clusters of producers analyzed in Latin America by Altenberg and Meyer-
Stammer (1999) where the largest threats were cheap imports from East Asia. On the other
hand, the potential to access world markets and the considerable advantages in marketing and
exploiting scale economies that this aﬀords, provides an opportunity for enhanced productivity
and proﬁt if standards can be raised suﬃciently to compete on an international scale.19
3.1 Modeling openness
It is immediately clear that these positive beneﬁts could not occur if starting in the (0,0) no-trust
equilibrium. In that case, free and open access to world markets would not lead to any change
in levels of modern production, since entrepreneurs lack trustworthy trading partners, and even
basic modern production cannot get oﬀ the ground.20 However, suppose that an economy starts in
a situation where there already exists suﬃcient trustworthiness, so that some modern production
already has a foothold, i.e. an economy starting in the
¡
βA,p A¢
steady state. In this section
we consider what happens when allowing trade on world markets in this case. We allow the
increases in the scale of modern production to raise technical productivity by construction, and
ask whether this necessarily increases trustworthiness, entrepreneurship and welfare.
The general equilibrium consequences of accessing world markets and implementing a new
18See Krueger (1992) for further discussion of these changes.
19Our analysis is of the impact of trade in allowing industrial productivity to rise. We abstract from the usual
well-known beneﬁts arising from the reallocation of resources in line with comparative advantage. In what follows
we model the move to openness in an extremely reduced form way by only considering the eﬀects on production
in the modern, or industrial sector. By also ignoring consumption beneﬁts, we further understate the beneﬁts of
openness, so that we have attempted to be suitably circumspect in the policy analysis that follows.
20Assuming that domestic entrepreneurs cannot trade with foreign contractors for their non-contractible inputs.
21technology will not be modeled directly. The important features emphasized by openness in the
preceding discussion are the possibility of accessing larger markets which can make the imple-
mentation of more productive technologies eﬃcient. We capture these features in a partial and
“reduced form” way through the following two exogenous changes in the model: (i) the variable
k increases, reﬂecting the higher ﬁxed cost involved in production at the larger scale {denote the
new variable kW, where W mnemonically denotes “world” markets); (ii) the value π increases,
reﬂecting the fact that, if successful, the ability to sell on a larger market will generate higher
unit sales and higher gross proﬁts. Since π(·) is a function, we deﬁne a new function πW (·) which
corresponds to an upward proportionate shift in the function π (·).21 The new values, πW (·) and
kW, need to also satisfy the parameter restrictions, assumptions 1 to 4, to ensure existence.
3.1.1 The Eﬀect of Openness on Steady States
Recall the two diﬀerential equations governing the dynamics of this system
dβ = βt (1 − βt)Φ(pt [(1 − α)π (pt)+γ − b] − F) R 0, (13)
dp = αβtπ(pt) − k R 0. (14)
For given p and β substituting πW (pt) for π (pt) in (13) and solving for points at which dβ =0
yields pBW <p B,a n dpAW >p A. Intuitively, this is because of an upward shift in ﬁgure 1. In
(β,p) space this implies a rightward shift in the locus dβ =0a tt h es t a b l es t e a d ys t a t ea n da











Figure 6, Change in dβ =0loci with openness
21Allowing for non-proportionate shifts in this function leads to qualitatively similar, though somewhat more
complicated, changes in the steady state. These are discussed subsequently.
22The eﬀect of openness on (14) is more complex. The direction of change in the locus dp =0 ,






It is not possible to a priori rule out either inequality. We consider two cases separately in the
next two sections, each one corresponding to a diﬀerent direction of inequality in (15). However,
without even considering the eﬀect on the dp =0locus, it can be immediately established that
any new stable steady state, if it were to occur at a point pAW >p A, would constitute a welfare
improvement:
Proposition 4 Welfare across interior steady states is increasing in p.
Intuitively, welfare in an interior steady state with openness rises because such a steady state
necessarily involves higher entry, p, into modern production. Even though the new steady state
has ﬁxed costs higher, kW >k ,by construction, Assumption 1 still holds so that πW (1) >k W.
Necessarily then increased entry into modern production is welfare improving. Since expected
proﬁts to ﬁrms in modern production are dissipated by entry in a steady state, welfare implications
can be inferred directly from considering expected outcomes for contractors, which are higher for
either type.
3.1.2 When Openness Decreases Reliance on Social Capital it Always Works




k . In this case, the change in steady state conﬁg u r a t i o n si sa s


















Figure 7, Convergence on interior with fall in dp =0locus
23The dynamics of convergence to the new welfare improving steady state βAW,p AW are de-
picted by the arrows in the diagram. Change ﬁrst implies a horizontal jump in the p direction
until on the new dp =0locus, and then convergence along this to the new steady state. There
is an initial increase in entrepreneurship reﬂecting the increased rewards, but then, with lower
evolutionary pressure for trustworthiness and its consequent decline, subsequent falls in entrepre-
neurship follow until the new steady state is reached. In general, the change in level of β from the
old to the new steady state is ambiguous (though depicted as lower in the ﬁgure) since it depends
on the relative size of the shifts in either locus; however, the level of p is unambiguously higher.
Ambiguity in the direction of β change is caused by the fact that because increased proﬁtability is
proportionately higher than increased ﬁxed costs, openness requires less reliance on trustworthi-
ness. Note also that convergence to the welfare improving steady state occurs generically for any
sized shift downward in the dp =0locus. If the shift were larger so that horizontal adjustment
implied p =1 , the convergence would simply involve a vertical decline, i.e., a reduction in β
for given p =1 , until the dp =0locus were reached and then a similar pattern of southwest
convergence.
This change paints an optimistic picture of openness as a path to development. It suggests
that, when such openness involves a process that is LESS reliant on the social capital (as ev-
idenced by the fact that the same net level of returns can be obtained with a lower level of
trustworthiness)22 then it is bound to succeed, i.e. lead to more production (higher p) and higher
welfare. However, even though the current case cannot be strictly ruled out, there are reasons
to doubt that investing in scale in order to access world markets requires less social capital, as
here. Increasing scale usually implies more vulnerability to opportunism. Katz (1987) has argued
that vulnerability was a principal reason for ﬁrms in LDCs using production methods requiring
lower ﬁxed capital and smaller scale. One may reasonably expect that openness, which forces
the development of larger scale modern production, should raise reliance on social capital. We
consider that case now.
3.1.3 The Case When Openness Increases Reliance on Social Capital




k . For a given chance of success, i.e., holding β ﬁxed,
the expected returns to risky modern production fall in this case. The phase diagram sees an
upward shift in the dp =0locus, as shown below:






















Figure 8, Convergence on interior with rise in dp =0locus
Here again the ﬁgure depicts a case of success through openness. Even though entrepreneurs
are MORE reliant on trustworthiness for production to be successful, there is still more entry, and
p rises in the new steady state. This is because the inﬂuence of the evolutionary forces increases
β in the new steady state. This increase in β, in turn, reinforces the entry of more entrepreneurs
in modern production, and the net eﬀect is a mutually supportive higher level of both modern
production and social capital, together with higher welfare in the new steady state.
The path of convergence to the new steady state depicted in the ﬁg u r ei st h ec o n v e r s eo ft h a t
previously. As the economy opens up, there is an immediate and sharp decline in the amount
of entrepreneurship in modern production. The increased riskiness of the larger scale technology
required to access world markets, reﬂected in kW changing more than πW, and the initially
unchanged level of β, initially lowers relative returns in modern production. The reason for this
decline is the fast reaction of risk taking entrepreneurs relative to the slow adjustment of the
population’s type; if the population type could immediately jump to its new steady state level,
βAW, there would be no decline. However, despite the decline, convergence to the interior steady
state still occurs because evolutionary forces lead to increased pressure for the trustworthy type,
and with more trustworthy trading partners, entrepreneurs re-enter modern production, in turn,
increasing evolutionary incentives for the trustworthy types, raising social capital, and moving
the system towards the new better steady state.
253.1.4 A Failure of Development













steady state. If p0 <p BW then the economy uniquely converges
to the welfare dominated (0,0) steady state.
Figure 9 below sketches the movement for the case of p0 <p BW. Note that the horizontal
movement of p in the ﬁgure reﬂects the new equilibrium αβAπW (p)=kW yielding a value of



















Figure 9 Convergence to corner with fall in dp =0locus.
This ﬁgure depicts the pessimistic scenario for development through openness — a complete
breakdown in ﬂedgling modern production, rampant opportunism, total distrust, dismantling of
existing social capital, and reduced welfare.
23Recall that when π
00 > 0 is allowed, it is not possible to rule out multiple stable steady states in the interior
of the phase space. In that case, the analogy of Proposition 5’s extreme failure of development would occur when
the level of β is below that required to sustain the lowest (β,p) interior steady state. There would then also be the
possibility of changes that could induce smaller failures and convergence to lower interior steady states, but at least
for some parameters, the dynamics sketched above would continue to hold. Allowing for non-uniform shifts in the
dp =0locus would also not aﬀect the qualitative nature of these dynamics. The main complication would however
be that the inequality deﬁned in equation (16) would no longer be independent of p. Again, the comparative static
implication sketched above would continue to hold in some form, though the possibility of multiple expectations
dependent outcomes could arise.
26The complementarity in production between rapidly adjusting entrepreneurs and slow to
adjust trustworthy types is the root cause of the diﬀerence in the two cases. The risk taking
entrepreneurs — those who stand to lose from opportunistic behaviour — depend on the trustworthy,
but the trustworthy also depend on the entrepreneurs to provide the trading opportunities from
which they stand to beneﬁt the most. The critical diﬀerence between the scenario above and the
case previously is that, in this scenario, the slightly larger decline in entrepreneurship means that
there are relatively few opportunities for the trustworthy to ﬁnd trading partners. This lack of
trading partners drives evolutionary incentives to favor opportunism ahead of trustworthiness.
Even though the trustworthy who could ﬁnd trade would be extremely productive, the lack of
trading partners implies that evolutionary incentives switch to favoring opportunism. Through
time, the further increases in opportunism reinforce this entrepreneurial exit, which, in turn,
encourages even more opportunism and so on. The opening to world markets and the opportunity
to use a more productive technology sets the economy onto a path, the end result of which is a
complete erosion of the initially good social capital.
This potentially damaging eﬀect of openness has been emphasized in the development studies
literature, especially with respect to the survival of small scale enterprises. McCormick (1999) in
her survey covering six industrial clusters in Africa identiﬁed openness to markets as the biggest
challenge faced by ﬁve of these clusters. However, it has not been clear previously why this should
be of concern. True, the inﬂux of cheaper goods undermines their potential, and their inability
to attain suﬃcient quality, or a low enough price, hampers their capacity to compete on world
markets. But the standard interpretation is simply that this is a reallocation of resources towards
areas of comparative advantage, and should not be a concern per se. Though the beneﬁts for
free-trade have been well known to economists for some time, a counter argument pointing out
the “de-industrializing” eﬀect of free-trade on LDCs and even the potential for growth to fall
as a consequence has been emphasized.24 This is often articulated in terms of a break-down in
social capital, though no formal model of this has been provided. The analysis here provides
a framework in which such arguments can be formally considered. As we have shut down the
usual avenues through which openness raises welfare, our framework cannot address the relative
merits of openness. Such a parsimonious model, in any case, is not intended as an instrument for
welfare based policy conclusions. Instead, we use the model to shed light on policies that would
encourage the maintenance of industrial capability and social capital, conditional upon this being
an end.
24Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) provide a clear conceptual account of these arguments. Matsuyama (1992)
demonstrates formally that openness may lower growth.
273.2 Policy
The standard prescription of the New Institutional Economics of, for example, Williamson (1985)
and North (1990), is that if contracting and enforcement can be improved suﬃciently, individual
type considerations become less critical, and productivity improving technologies can be imple-
mented. This is also true of the model here. If contracting is good enough, then the problems
arising from type variation disappear.25 The restriction we have maintained throughout is that
such institutional improvements cannot occur suﬃciently. As the literature cited earlier suggests,
type considerations seem to play an important role today in LDCs precisely because of weakness
in enforcement provided by institutional means. The policies we explore now are useful in such
situations.
Gradual change is good
The large size of decline in p causes convergence on the bad steady state in the case of failure.
If the change could be broken into smaller components, which are introduced sequentially and
gradually, then the negative outcome can always be avoided. To see this, consider a convexiﬁcation




and πW (p) −
π(p), only a fraction of the changes, say proportion δ<1, are implemented in 1
δ steps. Thus,
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Then the magnitude of leftward shift in the locus dp =0is smaller, as depicted by the ﬁrst dotted
line below.


















25What is needed is that the amount b that the traders can steal from entrepreneurs falls below what they could
earn by obtaining their ex post share of the proﬁts. Analogously, this also corresponds to increasing punishment
for those who violate agreements.
28If δ can be made small enough, the leftward jump in p can be reduced so that suﬃcient
entrepreneurship exists to sustain positive evolutionary forces favoring increased trustworthiness.
Note in the ﬁgure that the leftward jump in p to the ﬁrst dotted line is suﬃciently small to
maintain evolutionary incentives for trustworthiness. If the change had been implemented all at
once, that is, if the change involved implementation of the ﬁnal dotted line, then as the dashed
arrow in the ﬁgure shows, entrepreneurship would have fallen by so much that a point to the left
of pBW would have been reached, with, thereafter, convergence on the bad (0,0) steady state. As
depicted in the sequenced change, in contrast, the movement in the system stays in the North
East direction. Once β, and consequently p,h a v ei n c r e a s e ds u ﬃciently then the next step in the
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is depicted as the second parallel dotted line, and the process repeated. By gradualizing the
changes in this way, the economy can be forced to converge on the good equilibrium and avoid
the bad one.
The dynamics of adjustment outlined above provide a possible explanation for why it is that
the early industrializing countries of Western Europe that developed the technology which gave
rise to sustained productivity growth may have been able to coordinate on the good steady state,
whereas the countries that were late to industrialize, and who have the opportunity to do so by
importing that technology dramatically, may not be successful in doing so. In particular, early
industrializers had to implement productivity improvements gradually simply because technology
improvements had to be discovered, and such discovery was, by its very nature, a drawn out
process. Thus, the process of development in the West was one of gradual increases in productivity,
similar in nature to the sequential outward shifts in the dp =0l o c u st h a tw eh a v es k e t c h e da b o v e .
These gradual changes preserve evolutionary incentives for trustworthiness and allow convergence
on the good state. The supposed advantage of being a follower country is that technology does
not have to be invented; it can be taken “oﬀ the shelf” and implemented in production directly.
However, as Figure 9 above shows, such dramatic changes can have a disastrous eﬀect on any
existing trustworthiness, and not only fail to be utilized in production, but push the economy to
a steady state with lower welfare and productivity than where it started.
The policy implication here for gradualization is reminiscent of older arguments in the devel-
opment literature which pointed towards a “dynamic externality” arising from small and medium
scale manufacturing activity. Such externalities were argued to imply that it takes time for ﬁrms
to become competitive, see for example Krueger (1992, p.7) for a critical view of this. The very
slowness of type adjustment in the model here shows a new, and perhaps more plausible, rationale
for these previous arguments.
The result here also suggests a beneﬁt to gradualism which can shed light on the diﬀerential
performance of ex-communist reform economies. Although these economies are still in ﬂux, and
29conclusions about the reform processes are tentative, Roland (2000) provides an authoritative
account of the interim consensus view. He summarizes the reform experience that occurred
through the 1990s in the light of two opposing views; one of which he terms the “Washington
Consensus” which represents a big-bang or shock-therapy view, and the other the “Evolutionary-
Institutionalist Perspective” which is gradualist or incrementalist. The Washington Consensus
substantially inﬂuenced policy in all countries except China. The diﬀerence in the focus of
r e f o r m si ss u m m a r i z e do np . 3 3 0 . T h ef o c u so ft h eWashington Consensus is “Liberalization,
Privatization and Stabilization”, whereas the Evolutionary-Institutionalist focus is the “creation
of institutional underpinning of markets to encourage strong entrepreneurial entry”. It would be
wrong to conclude that the Washington Consensus ignores institutions; however, it does place
primary emphasis on rules of law and enforcement. The evolutionary-institutionalist approach, in
contrast, takes a more primary and more comprehensive view of institutions. Included in this is
the view that functioning institutions depend on more than explicitly stated rules. Institutional
conditions include
“not only legal and ﬁnancial change, but also conditions of law enforcement, reform
of the organization of government, and the development of self-enforcing social norms
that foster entrepreneurship, trust and respect for legality and commitment.” Roland
p.333 (italics inserted).
Roland concludes that the gradual changing economies, consistent with the evolutionary-
institutionalist view, have out-performed those subjected to shock-therapy in line with the Wash-
ington Consensus. The distinction between gradual and rapid changers is itself nuanced, as
it depends on the dimensions being considered. For instance, some countries undertook rapid
privatization of public enterprises but only gradual price liberalization, and little enterprise re-
structuring; also, de facto adjustment policies often varied from oﬃcially stated policy objectives.
Most had a combination of rapid and slow reforming elements. Roland provides detailed analy-
sis of theories explaining the relative dominance of the evolutionary-institutionalist view. Some
relate to the political economy of reform and others to the particulars of actual privatization and
liberalization programs. Another view countenanced stems from what he terms “social behaviour,
social norms, and social capital”, but this is not explicitly considered, since, as he notes, this is
relatively under-researched. The analysis of the previous section provides such a social capital
based account for the relative beneﬁts of gradual reform.
Direct encouragement of trustworthiness is beneﬁcial
Trustworthiness clearly provides an externality here, since the trustworthy make production
viable and hence raise expected returns of entrepreneurs. Conversely, entrepreneurs, by under-
taking risky production and only receiving fraction α of the returns, provide externalities for the
trustworthy. Optimal policy should encourage activities generating positive externalities. There
30are numerous examples of government policies in LDCs aiming to do just this in the context
of emerging industrial clusters. Altenberg and Meyer-Stamer (1999) provided a review of these
policy initiatives, many of which are geared towards maintaining trustworthiness and enhanc-
ing cooperation in business networks, in the Latin American context. Some examples are: the
Proyectos de Fomento in Chile and the Empresas Integrados in Mexico. These are government
ﬁnanced initiatives which promote the association of small enterprises, the main objectives of
which are to consolidate the building of trust amongst group members. These policies work
through provision of subsidies, or tax advantages to joining members, who are then encouraged,
along with other members, to explore areas of mutual gain and improvement. Another example is
policies that indirectly reward cooperative behaviour, for example providing ﬁnancial services for
micro enterprises that build on group guarantees, as in Rhyne and Otero (1992), which encourage
and reward ﬁrms for building trust based bonds. In terms of the model here the government in
these examples, by providing direct ﬁnancial rewards for increased trusting and facilitating that
behaviour, improves the relative rewards of the trustworthy type and thus improves evolutionary
incentives for its maintenance. Though more focused on public good provision, a related policy
example is provided by Uphoﬀ’s (2000) irrigation case study that was discussed in the introduc-
tion. The successful form of irrigation system depicted there, which encouraged cooperation and
appealed to underlying norms of social fairness in activating eﬀorts, became Sri Lankan national
policy by an act of cabinet in 1988.
4 Discussion and conclusions
Our model has two main features which are non-standard. The ﬁrst of which is that it rules
out, by construction, the possibility of ever designing incentive compatible contracts that will
ensure production is not subject to opportunism. Thus, in our framework, successful production
depends critically on agents being the right “type”. The type required is what we have termed
“trustworthy”, meaning agents who are willing to fulﬁll obligations even when these are not in
their pecuniary self interest. We have argued that this type concern is a realistic reﬂection of
the actual concerns which businesses have in setting up trading relationships with their suppliers,
where such relationships do not depend on the incentive compatibility of the interaction but
instead on an inference about trading partners’ inherent reliability.
The second feature we have used is an evolutionary model which allows for selection of types
using a criterion which is broader than the usual criterion of “ﬁtness” used in standard evolu-
tionary models. In our framework this is essential since, by construction, opportunists always
do better, in a strictly pecuniary sense, than the trustworthy, and would thus always be selected
using a ﬁtness based replicator. On the grounds of realism alone, the broader non-ﬁtness based
selection is at least as plausible as the traditional one, and we have thus utilized a replicator,
31pioneered by Bisin and Verdier (2001) which allows this.
We have shown that such a framework provides a possible explanation for why productivity
improving changes, like for example opening to trade, can end up worsening production and
actually lowering welfare. This ﬁnding also provides an interpretation for why follower countries
may not be as successful in utilizing the technology pioneered in the West, and why countries
with access to the same technology may exhibit such marked diﬀerences in utilization. The
framework we have developed provides a number of policy conclusions which, broadly speaking,
argue the beneﬁts of gradualizing productivity improving changes in LDCs. It also provides a
new perspective on the post-communist reforms undertaken through the 1990s.
Though we have modeled this in a parsimonious framework, the basic insight would seem to
be readily generalizable to many settings. This is because it follows from only two essential con-
ditions. The ﬁrst is that culture, in particular trustworthiness or social capital, adjusts relatively
slowly in comparison with the speed at which ﬁrms are able to adjust their means of production.
The second is that social capital is inﬂuenced by the mode of production undertaken by ﬁrms,
and that changes which raise proﬁts may undermine evolutionary incentives for the maintenance
of social capital. We have been concerned here with elucidating these eﬀects in a simple and
uncomplicated framework; a more serious policy analysis would sacriﬁce simplicity and embed
these concerns in a more standard model that also allowed the beneﬁts of openness. We leave
such an analysis to future research.
Finally, the role of institutions has been entirely ignored here. However, institutions almost
certainly temper the relationship between social capital and economic actors in ways which miti-
gate the role of culture that has been emphasized here. Thus, at least for high levels of institutional
advancement, our result of a monotonic relationship between social capital and economic success,
need not hold. For instance, well functioning means of formal enforcement lessen vulnerability to
expropriation and hence lessen ﬁrms’ dependence on inherently trustworthy types. Well devel-
oped institutions of contract and enforcement in relatively rich countries can therefore act as a
substitute for social capital and ensure that, even where social capital is low, eﬃciency enhancing
improvements can be enacted. The correct focus of the present work is thus situations where
institutions of contract and enforcement are weak.
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
Suﬃciency:
We ﬁrst show that under the suﬃcient condition in the proposition, there exist two interior
valued steady states, in the last section of the proof we shall establish that one of these is always
unstable and the other stable. Suppose the suﬃcient condition holds so that there exists at least
one value of p, denoted p0, such that p0 [(1 − α)π (p0)+γ − b] − F>0. Then there must exist




+ γ − b
¤
−
F =0 . This follows immediately from the continuity of π in p, and Assumption 4. Moreover,
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The continuity and boundedness of π also ensure that there exists a lower level of p, i.e. 0 <
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− F =0 . From equations (9) and (10) this point
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opposite holds. The evolutionary implications of these p ranges for dβ in β,p space are depicted
in Figure 2.
Now consider how entrepreneurial entry is aﬀected by “types” in the population. That is,
consider E [απ(pt)] from (6). The critical relationship is:
βαπ(p)=k (18)
in (β,p) space. This locus of β and p values renders entrepreneurs indiﬀerent between modern
and traditional production, dp =0 . Since π0 < 0, this function is upward sloping in (β,p) space.
Note also that, for values of β,p above the function, entrepreneurs have incentive to enter modern
production since expected returns exceed ﬁxed costs, and the converse is true for points below
the function. When β =0 , from Assumption 2 (18) can never hold, even for p =0 ;t h u sw h e n
p =0 , (18) only holds when β>0. Thus the point at which this function cuts the β (vertical
axis) in β,p space is positive. When p =1 , it is clear that, from Assumption 1, if β =1then
απ(1) = απl >kso that (18) will not hold. The value of β at which (18) holds when p =1must
then be some β<1. Thus the dp =0function cuts the vertical axis above zero and is less than
1a tp =1 . The dynamics for entrepreneurs in β,p space are thus as shown in Figure 3.
Steady states occur when dβ =0and dp =0 . Because the dp =0locus takes positive values
of β, but less than 1, for all values of p ∈ [0,1], and under the assumed suﬃcient condition,
33pA,p B have both been shown to be elements of (0,1), thus necessarily there exist two such points,
denoted βA,p A and βB,p B. Combining the two ﬁgures 2 and 3 yields the phase space for both
endogenous variables and steady states are the points of intersection in Figure 4.
Necessity: We show that if the condition in the proposition does not hold, then there either
exists no interior steady state, or at most a unique one, which we demonstrate in the next section
is unstable. Suppose that for all p ∈ (0,1) p[(1 − α)π(p)+γ − b]−F ≤ 0. Necessarily, then either
p[(1 − α)π (p)+γ − b]−F<0 for all p in the range or for some p, p[(1 − α)π(p)+γ − b]−F =
0. Suppose the ﬁrst situation holds so that p[(1 − α)π (p)+γ − b] − F<0 for all p. Then,
necessarily, for all p, dβ < 0. Thus, the only point of stability for the system is β =0 . However
if β =0 , then necessarily from Assumption 2, expected proﬁts are 0πu =0 , so that p =0 , which
is not an interior point.
Now suppose the second situation holds, so that, for some p at least p[(1 − α)π (p)+γ − b]−
F =0 . Firstly, note that since π0 < 0 it can only be the case that this holds at a single p value.
Let that value be denoted pˆ. Thus the value pˆ, is the unique p value in the interior where
dβ =0 . By the same considerations as in the previous section, there necessarily exists a value of
β denoted βˆ at which the dp =0locus intersects pˆ. Thus, when p[(1 − α)π(p)+γ − b]−F =0











the latter of these is necessarily unstable, whereas the former is locally stable. In the
case where there exists a unique interior steady state
¡
βˆ,p ˆ¢
this steady state is always unstable.
First note that, from equation (7), in the interior, necessarily, dp =0always. Thus αβπ (p)=
k always, which implies that,
dp
dβ > 0 in the interior. Since p adjustment is immediate to ensure
this equality, the stability of the system is determined by analysis of the dβ equation. Recall this
equation is:
dβ = β (1 − β)Φ(p[(1 − α)π(p)+γ − b] − F).








At either interior steady state Φ(·)=0 , so that the ﬁrst term cancels. The sign then depends on
the second term and can be re-expressed as follows:
d2β = β (1 − β)
dΦ(·)
dβ








dβ > 0, and
dΦ(·)
dp = Φ0 (·)[p(1 − α)π0 +( 1− α)π(p)+γ − b]. Since, from (4)
Φ0 (·) > 0, the sign of the expression depends on the previous expression in square brackets. Con-
sider ﬁrst the steady state
¡
pB,βB¢
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> 0, where the sign follows from (17). Thus since this implies d2β>0,
the steady state is unstable. Consider next the steady state
¡
pA,βA¢
. The bracketed expression
is (1 − α)π
¡
pA¢
+ γ − b + pA (1 − α)π0 ¡
pA¢
< 0, where the sign follows from (16). Thus since




is the unique stable one.




then (1 − α)π
¡
pˆ¢
+ γ − b + pˆ (1 − α)π0 ¡
pˆ¢
=0 . However for β −→ βˆ from the left, d2β>0,
and for β −→ βˆ from the right, the sign of d2β>0, so that this steady state is also unstable.




P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :If p =0 ,d β<0 from (8). If β =0 , from equation (7) we have
p =0 , so (0,0) is a steady state. It is immediate that this corner steady state is locally stable
since dβ < 0 there.
If β =1 ,d β=0from (5), also from Assumption 1, βαπ(p) >kfor all p, thus, from equation



















dβ =0 . Then, noting that d
dβ [β (1 − β)] =
1 − 2β, we obtain:
d2β =( 1 − 2β).Φ
¡
(1 − α)π(1) + γ − b +( 1− α)π0 (1)
¢
=( 1 − 2β).Φ
³




(1 − α)πl + γ − b +( 1− α)π0 (1)
´
Note that from Assumption 4 (1 − α)πl + γ − b<0 and since π0 < 0 always we have d2β>0.
Thus the (1,1) steady state is unstable.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : In steady state
¡
βA,p A¢
expected utility of an opportunist equals
pAb, which clearly exceeds zero. In any interior steady state, the expected utility of each type






− F must also exceed zero. In the corner
steady state (0,0) expected utility of either type is zero. In both steady states entrepreneurs earn
zero expected proﬁt.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :Consider two interior steady states, with p levels denoted pAW and
pA <p AW respectively. The expected utility of an opportunist, E
£
uO¤
is pAWb and pAb in each







, so the trustworthy are also better oﬀ in the former steady state. In interior
steady states entrepreneurs have expected proﬁt equal to zero, so they are indiﬀerent.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :Immediate by using the dynamics established in section 2.7 and
considering Figure 9 in the case of p0 <p BW. Note that the horizontal movement of p in the ﬁgure
35reﬂects the new equilibrium αβAπW (p)=kW yielding a value of p<p BW as in the statement of
proposition. Figure 8 sketches movement in the case of p0 >p BW.¥
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